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Abstract 
 
We develop a theoretical model of retail competition that include two sources of quality, one 
inherently linked to brand characteristics and the other linked to the retailer level of service. 
We then measure their contribution in explaining the observed price differentials for a sample 
of U.K. grocery retailer prices in the south of Coventry during the period November 1995 to 
March 1997. We find that retailers that offer a higher quality service sell same quality brands 
at higher prices. These price premia are explained solely by differences in service quality 
levels. We find econometric evidence that they amount to 6 percent for national brands and to 
a range between 9 percent and 15 percent for low-quality store brands. Besides, at a given 
store, the price premia paid for the national brand is positive. These differentials are very 
large: around 150 percent between national brands and low-quality store brands, around 40 
percent between national brands and high-quality store brands. Also, the price differential 
between the national brand and the low-quality store brand does not increase with its service 
quality. Besides, the price of the high-quality store brand approaches the price of the national 
brand when service quality increases. Thus suggesting that stores that offer high quality 
service uses the level of service as a strategic tool to target the leading national brand 
consumers. 
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1 Introduction
The selling of simple products like food and household goods is becoming a very complex
matter. Many business of di¤erent sort either store based (like supermarkets, convenience
stores, departement stores), or non-store based (like internet retailing, home retailing)
ght for customers, who are more concerned with price and quality in downturn economic
periods. As a result, similar products are often sold at very di¤erent prices across the
market. Both the quality and the brand name of the product as well as the service quality
of a particular retailer will be important features to determine the nal price. Our research
aim is to to develop a theoretical model of retail competition that include both sources of
quality and then measure their contribution in explaining the observed price di¤erentials
for a sample of U.K. grocery retailers.
The retail industry is the second largest industry in the U.S.. According to the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 14.4 million people were employed in the U.S. retail industry
as of April, 2010. Besides, the total amount of sales for the U.S. retail industry (including
food service and automotive) was $4.13 trillion, according to the latest annual report from
the U.S. Census Bureau (calendar year 2009). Essentially, the retail sector facilitates the
purchase by consumers of 27% of Domestic Final Demand, the goods and services sold to
nal purchasers. In the European Union, more than 30% of the enterprises was active in
the distributive trade sector (composed of motor trade, wholesale trade, and retail trade
and repair) and generated EUR 1,099 thousand million of value added in 2006, whilst
providing employment for about 31.7 million persons. EUR 146 thousand million and 7
million employees come from the retail trade (see Europe in gures  Eurostat yearbook
2010).
The vast majority of all retail stores are single-store businesses, however these single-
store businesses account for substantially less than half of all retail sales. The majority of
the revenue in the retail industry is generated by companies that run retail "chains". This
industry is becoming more concentrated and large retaliers (e.g. Wal-Mart, Carrefour,
Tesco, Metro) are included among the big actors in the nowadays economies. The biggest
retailer in the world is Wal-Mart, which generated over $344 billion in revenue in 2009.
The retail industry can be divided into a number of smaller sectors or "sub-industries".
In particular, it is split between store and non-store retailers. The rst category is in
turn split into grocery and non grocery retailers,1 while in the second category retailers
1This classication can be rened into more subdivisions as Department Stores (e.g. Macys, Kohls, J.C.
Penney, Saks, Nordstrom, John Lewis, Selfridges, Harrods, Debenham, El Corte Ingles, Galeries Lafayette),
Discount Stores (e.g. Wal-Mart, Target, K-Mart, Costco, Sears) among the non-grocery retailers and
supermarkets, hypermarkets, discounters, convenience stores and so on.
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are classied attending to their type of sale, e.g. vending, internet retailing, and home
shopping.
To undertake our analysis we focus on the U.K. grocery sector. The U.K. grocery
market was worth £ 146.3 billion in 2009, which supposed an increase of 4.8 per cent over
2008. Groceries account for 12.8 percent of total household spending in the U.K., making it
the third largest area of expenditure, following housing and transport. Food and grocery
expenditures account for 52p in every £ 1.00 of retail spending (excluding restaurants).
The industry is divided into four broad categories: a) convenience retailing (20,71% of
the grocery market), b) traditional retail (4,44%), c) hypermarkets, supermarkets and
superstores (72,32%); and d) on-line (2,53%) (source IGD). Category c) includes Asda,
Morrisons, Sainsburys and Tesco (the four largest supermarkets); 11 smaller chains such
as Somereld, Waitrose and Marks & Spencer; and discounterssuch as Aldi, Lidl and
Netto.2 There are substantial di¤erences in the scale, strategy and product o¤ering of the
di¤erent rms.
Grocery retailers are competing within a relatively mature market. Stable population
limits growth of food consumption. Food expenditure (other than eating out) accounts
for a declining share of household budgets. This has driven multiple retailers to ercely
compete for market share through multifold strategies as price, range and service; retail-
ers have shifted to premium products, diversied into non-grocery products and services,
enlarged existing stores and opened high-street convenience stores. That is, retailers
strategies include three relevant dimensions: 1) price, 2) brand quality competition, and
3) retailer di¤erentiation. Regarding the price dimension, note that operation margins
are usually low and there is a wide range of promotional price activity.3 As for brand
quality competition, customers weigh up quality of product and service against the money
involved in buying groceries. In the recent years consumers are more concerned on healthy
products, organic food and convenience (semi-prepared) food where quality is the driven
force rather than price. Finally, retailersdi¤erentiation strategies basically include lo-
cation, the introduction of store-brands, the product line length and availability and the
level of service or service quality.4 Service quality includes shop ambience, aisle space,
2The four biggest chains account for 67.9% of the grocery market. Tesco has 28% market share,
followed by ASDA (15.2%), Sainsburys (14.3%) and Morrisons (10.4%). After the Cooperative purchased
Somereld, this group now has 8% market share (Cooperative at 6.3% and Somereld at 2.7%). Source
GAIN Report UK Retail Food Sector 2009 and UK Supermarket Chain Proles, USDA.
3Based on O¢ ce for National Statistics data, the OFT estimates that real prices for food fell by 7.3 %
between January 2000 and December 2005. (see The grocery market: The OFTs reasons for making a
reference to the Competition Commission, 2005)
4Responses to the consultation on the O¢ ce Fair Trades Proposed Decision, particularly from individ-
uals, made clear that access to a range of products of di¤erent stores (including independents) is valued
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easy navigation, size of parking areas, queuing times, opening hours, number of credit and
debit cards accepted and helpfulness of sta¤.
In particular, focusing in the di¤erences between supermarkets chains and discounters,
it is common to observe that discounters concentrate on the so called value items, i.e. low
price and simple packaged goods. They o¤er less products and less service quality than
the supermarket chains. Davies and Brito (2004) report that many discounters operate
with as few as four full time equivalent sta¤ per store compared with the 200 or more in
a superstore. And also that a supermarket chain may o¤er 20,000 product lines while a
discounter only 1,500.
Prior to empirically analysing the price di¤erentials among brands, where data col-
lected from the UK grocery industry are used, we propose a theoretical model that consists
of the following. A supermarket and a discounter compete by choosing the output sold
for its product line. Both rms are asymmetric with respect to some of their strategies.
We assume that the supermarket sells three di¤erent brands, which are ranked in terms of
brand quality: a national brand, a high-quality store brand and a low-quality store brand.
The discounter, however, sells only two brands, a national brand and a low-quality store
brand. Furthermore, the supermarket and the discounter provide a certain level of service
quality that a¤ects the consumerswillingness to pay for the brands sold in their stores.
We solve for the Cournot quantity output equilibrium and compute the price di¤erences
among brands. We nd that price premia across rms are explained by di¤erences in
service quality levels and they are independent of the brand type. Regarding price premia
within a retailer, we nd that price premia of the national brand over the low-quality
store brand are increasing with the national brand level of quality and wholesale price
and decreasing with the level of quality and marginal cost of the low-quality store brand.
Therefore, those premia are rm independent. Further, as the supermarket service level
increases the price premia of the national brand over the high-quality store brand decreases
and thus increases the one of the high over the low-quality store brands. The e¤ects of the
discounter level of service are just the opposite. Basically, the supermarket level of service
can be understood as a strategic tool to deal with competition with the leading national
brands. In fact, a variation in the supermarkets service quality has the same qualitative
e¤ects as a variation in the high-quality store brand quality level on price premia, but the
advantage of the former is that is better controled by the retailer than the latter.
Regarding the empirical treatment, the data used in this analysis are prices directly
collected by the authors in three stores in the south of Coventry, one from each of the rst
and second biggest supermarket chains in the UK at the time do data collection (Tesco
by a signicant number of consumers.
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and Sainsburys) and the large soft discounter (Kwik Save). The dataset is composed
of 27 price observations for 46 products taken from November 1995 to March 1997 on a
fortnightly basis (but for the Christmas periods). The criteria used to select the products
for the sample are the following: i) they should be present in the grocery basket of the
representative UK consumer, and ii) they should be available in all the three retailers in
the sample. We nd empirical support of the two testable implications of the theoretical
model on service-quality premia. First, for a given quality, the price premia is the same
for both supermarkets (since both o¤er the same service level). We nd signicant price
di¤erences of 6 percent in the national brand and between the 9 and 15 percent for the
low-quality store brand. Further no signicant di¤erences are obtained between Tesco
and Sainsburys prices of the national brand and the low-quality store brand. The second
testable implication is that for each retailer the service-quality premium is brand-quality
independent. We test this implication by estimating the di¤erentials in premiun between
Tesco and Kwik Save for the national brand and for the low-quality store brand, and the
same between Sainsburys and Kiwk Save. Our nding is that for Tesco the hipothesis
is supported, but for Sainburys there is a statistically signicant di¤erence in the price
premia between brands. Regarding brand-quality premia, the theoretical model predicts
that the price premia of the national brands over the low-quality store brands are rm
independent. Our estimates yield a positive premia that ranks from 148 to 171 percent.
Also, the teoretical testable implication is partially supported as we do not nd signicant
di¤erences between Tesco and Kiwk Save premia although they are di¤erent in service
quality. Finally, our estimates of the price premia of national brands over high- quality
store brands yields positive di¤erences that rank between 38 and 40 percent with no
signicant di¤erence among supermarkets. Similarly, the price premia of the high over the
low-quality store brand range from 80 to 87.5 percent and no signicant di¤erences across
supermarkets.
Multiproduct retailer competition in brand quality has been dealth with basically
through the competition between one national brand (high quality) and one store brand
(low quality). Several papers address the e¤ects of the introduction of a low quality
brand. For example Scott Morton and Zettelmeyer (2004) study the reason why a retailer
might prefer carrying a store brand rather than a national brand in its product line.
They nd that the ability of retailers to pinpoint the store brand positioning close to the
leading national brand is the reason why retailers replace a second national brand with its
store brand. Gabrielsen and Sørgard (2007) analyse the e¤ect of store brand introduction
(or even the threat of introduction) on prices of the national brand. They nd that,
when exclusivity is conceded by a retailer, this is at expense of price concesions from
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the national brand producer. However, if exclusivity is not achieved, i.e. a store brand
is introduced, this lead to higher retail prices on national brands. Multiproduct retailer
competition in service quality5 has been considered to understand the e¤ects of predation
and of vertical restraints in welfare by Walsh and Whelan (1999) and Moner-Colonques
(2006), respectively.6 In Walsh and Whelan (1999), multi-product retailers rst choose
the level of services and then compete in prices. They show that under imperfections
such as imperfect competition or imperfect information, predatory pricing by retailers can
lead to higher welfare that second-best market intervention in the way of price controls
by antitrust authorities due to the interacion between price and service. Also, Moner-
Colonques (2006) models quantity and retail service competition between di¤erentiated
multi-product retailers to conclude that, when intra-brand and in-store competition are
rather large, exclusivity leads to higher levels of service and welfare. Our paper contributes
to the literature of multiproduct di¤erentiated retail competition. It combines two di¤erent
sources of quality di¤erentiation, one coming from the brand characteristics and name and
another coming from the level of consumer service o¤ered by the seller; this allows us to nd
how the demand interactions among di¤erently valued brands can explain price di¤erences
within and across multi-product retailers.
On the empirical side7 our paper is related to Davies and Brito (2004). Their approach
di¤er from ours in several respects. They adopt the value system perspective in their
analysis.8 Then, their goal is to explain the price di¤erences that arise among competing
value systems on a selected number of category products in the UK grocery industry. In
contrast with us, they focus on data on the transfer prices of goods and services from
5Models with one manufacturer and single product retailers competing in price and service include
Caillaud and Rey (1986), for a competitive supply of retailers, Mathewson and Winter (1984), where
retailers are spatially di¤erentiated and Perry and Porter (1990), who consider a representative consumer
model of demand to generate retail di¤erentiation.
6Winter (1993) explores the relationship between vertical restrains and welfare in the case of spatially
di¤erentiated single-product retailers. He nds that, when retailers compete in prices and in services which
reduces the time a consumer devotes to shopping, retailers are biased against service competition resulting
in a suboptimal outcome. Either a price oor or exclusive territories are su¢ cient to restore the rst-best.
7Testing the e¤ect of quality on price di¤erentials in the banana market, Wiggins and Raboy (1996)
nd that price premia associated with containerization (as a quality attribute) are quite robust and explain
the bulk of inter-company price di¤erences, whereas brand-name does not. Also, see Shepard (1991) for
the gasoline retail market in eastern Massachusetts. She nds price di¤erentials consistent with the price
discrimination hypothesis and inconsistent with cost-driven di¤erentials. On average, the price di¤erential
at multiproduct stations is 9 cents -11 cents higher than the di¤erential across single-product stations.
The higher di¤erential comes largely from higher full-service prices.
8When a rm belongs to a superior form of organization, its competitive advantage is explained not
only by its own value to the chain but also by how it ts within the organization . The relevant actor is
the full organization not each member (see Porter, 1984).
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one value chain member to another and on the costs added within each value chain by
di¤erent elements such as production, marketing and logistics. They nd on average
a 42,6 percent price premium paid for national brands when compared with the store-
brands sold by supermarkets.r The source of this price premium being the internal costs
of brand manufacturers, in particular, marketing costs (i.e. consumer advertising and trade
marketing), employment costs and R&D expenses. Also, the selling prices of store brands
in discount stores were on average 17.9 percent lower than store brands in supermarkets.
Once again the internal cost are the source of the price premia since they report that
employee costs as a percentage of turnover in the leading British grocery retailer were
9.9 percent compared to 6.7 percent in the leading discount store operator. Also, that
discounters have a faster stock turning than a supermarket so a similar return on capital
can be achieved at lower gross margin and lower operating cost. Finally, regarding the
relevance of product quality and brand image in explaining price di¤erences they nd that
only in one product category was there a quality justication for the higher prices charged
by the leading manufacturer brand. Although a straightforward comparison between their
results and ours is di¢ cult to assess, our estimates are particularly closer to theirs regarding
the service-quality premia. We obtain a 15 percent increase of low-quality store-brands
prices in supermarkets over the same brands sold by discounters. Also and regarding the
price premia between national brands and store brands sold by supermarkets, we nd
higher di¤erences when the low-quality brands are considered (between 148 percent and
171 percent), but similar when high-quality store brands are regarded, between 38 percent
and 40 percent.
The next section sets out the theoretical model and delivers the results. Section 3 deals
with the econometric model and the description of the dataset. Section 4 is focused on the
estimation and the empirical conclusions and the nal Section contains the conclusions.
2 The theoretical model
Consider an industry that produces three di¤erentiated brands which are sold by two
di¤erentiated retailers. Consumers have maximum willingness to pay for each that depend
on each brand quality level or brand name. Also, consumers show a di¤erent willingness
to pay depending on which retailer is selling the brand. Further the three brands in the
market are imperfect substitutes from each other.
Retailers are also di¤erentiated regarding their product line breadth. There is one
that o¤ers the full product line of three brands, while the other only o¤ers the highest
and lowest qualities. Since we are focusing on the grocery market, it can be interpreted
that the highest level of quality corresponds to the leading national brand, while the other
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two correspond to store brands. Thus the retailer with the full product line is selling two
qualities of store brands, while the other just the low quality one.9 This implies that only
ve brands are available to consumers. As the scope of the paper is to analyse the short-
run, e.g. price di¤erentials, all long-run strategies (brand quality levels, service quality
levels and product line choices) are, so far, considered as given.
To be more specic, let qrj be the quantity of brand of quality j sold by retailer r;where
j = N;H;L and r = S;D: Subscripts N , H and L denote the national brand, the high-
quality store brand and the low-quality store brand.respectively. Also, subscripts S and
D denote a supermarket and a discounter. Let q = (qSN ; q
S
H ; q
S
L; q
D
N ; q
D
L ) be the column
vector of all the marketed brands. We consider a representative consumer who mazimizes
the following utility function: U(:) = 0q q0Mq+I; by choosing the level of consumption
for each brand. Parameter I represents all other goods and has a price normalized to
unity. The consumers budget constraint is taken as m = pq+I; where p denotes the price
vector. Column vector  = (SN ; 
S
H ; 
S
L; 
D
N ; 
D
L ) denote the maximum willigness to pay
for brands. We consider two basic features that explain the consumers willingnes to pay,
the brand quality attached to the product characteristics and the service quality related
to the retailersones. We will assume that both sorts of e¤ects enter additively in the
denition of the maximun willingness to pay, that is, rj = bj + xr; where bj and xr read
brand j0s quality level and retailer r0s service quality level, respectively.10 Finally,
M =
0BBBBBBB@
1 d e 1 e
d 1 f d f
e f 1 e 1
1 d e 1 e
e f 1 e 1
1CCCCCCCA
9An early contribution to the literature of endogenous product lines is Brander and Eaton (1984), which
studied whether multiproduct sellers preferred to compete in a compartmentalized fashion with each rm
focusing on a segment of the market, or head-to-head, with competition in every fraction of the market.
Product line decisions are also studied in the address model approach by Martínez-Giralt and Neven (1988),
Gilbert and Matutes (1993) and De Fraja (1993), where rms compete in non-price variables; number of
outlets, qualities and location, respectively. See also Moner-Colonques et al. (2011) for a non-address
approach with multiproduct rms in the context of vertical channel competition.
10There are two basic approaches to quality (vertical) di¤erentiation. One developed by Musa and
Rosen (1978) the other by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), where consumers have identical preferences
but di¤erent incomes. Higher-income individuals have a higher willingness to pay for quality. The price
marginal e¤ects on each demand depend on quality levels. In Musa and Rosen (1978) in a symmetric way
while asymmetrically in Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979). We adopt a di¤erent approach as all the quality
attributes are included in the demandsintercepts this just meaning that a higher quality product has a
higher willingeness to pay. The advantage of this approach is that it can combine vertical and horizontal
di¤erentiation in a simple way.
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is the symmetric matrix that includes the di¤erent degrees of substitution among
brands in the inverse demand functions. That is, d is the degree of substitution between
the national brand and the high-quality store brand, e is the equivalent for the national
brand and the low-quality store brand and, nally, f is the degree of substitution between
the high and low-quality store brands. Note that brands of the same type and sold by
di¤erent retailers will a¤ect prices in the same manner. Throughout the paper we are
going to assume that 1 > d > f > e; which is interpreted as the national brand and the
high-quality store brand are the closest substitutes and that the highest di¤erentiation
is between the national brand and the low-quality store brand. The system of inverse
demand functions reads,
pSN = 
S
N   qSN   qDN   dqSH   e(qSL + qDL )
pSH = 
S
H   d(qSN + qDN )  qSH   f(qSL + qDL )
pSL = 
S
L   e(qSN + qDN )  fqSH   qSL   qDL
pDN = 
D
N   qSN   qDN   dqSH   e(qSL + qDL )
pDL = 
D
L   e(qSN + qDN )  fqSH   qSL   qDL :
Retailers compete in the market by choosing outputs so as to maximize the following
prots: RS = (pSN wN )qSN+(pSH cH)qSH+(pSL cL)qSL; RD = (pDN wN )qDN+(pDL  cL)qDL :
For the sake of the exposition, we consider that retailersmarginal cost only includes
the price at which they buy the product from manufacturers and, therefore, all other
distribution costs are assumed to be zero. The supermarket and the discounter are selling
products manufactured by the leading national brand producer and store brands that they
obtain from a competitive sector of manufacturers. Therefore, wN denotes the wholesale
price for the national brand, while cH and cL denote the marginal costs for the store
brands. It is assumed that wN > cH > cL:
The rst order conditions are obtained and correspond with the following system of
equations: ^ = Aq; where ^ is the maximum willingness to pay net of retailers marginal
costs column vector, and A is the matrix the includes marginal e¤ects of each marketed
brand on retailersmarginal prots. The equilibrium vector is q = A 1^; where equi-
librium outputs are function of all the relevant parameters. Both A and A 1 and the
equilibrium output expressions are in the Appendix 3.
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Result 1. Equilibrium output comparative statics:
(bN   wN ) (bH   cH) (bL   cL) xS xD
qSN +    +  
qSH   +    0
qSL    + +  
qDN + 0     +
qDL   0 +   +
where two cases are distinguised,
i) if 1+e < f+d; then both @q
S
N
@(bL cL) and
@qSL
@(bN wN ) are positive, while
@qSH
@xS
is negative;
ii) if f + d < 1 + e then @q
S
H
@xS
> 0; while @q
S
N
@(bL cL) and
@qSL
@(bN wN ) have an ambiguous
sign.
In view of the above result, the brand quality and service quality e¤ects are as ex-
pected in almost all the cases. That is, the equilibrium output of brand j sold by retailer
r is increasing with brand quality j and service quality r and decreasing on all the oth-
ers. There are two kinds of exceptions. Firstly, the discounters equilibrium outputs are
independent of the high-quality store brand and similarly the high-quality store brand
output is independent of the discounters service quality. Finally, there are unexpected
positive signs regarding the cross e¤ect of the national brand quality on the low quality
store brand equilibrium output and viceversa, and a negative sign on the e¤ect of the
supermarkets service quality on the high-quality store brand equilibrium output. This
occurs when e; the degree of substitution among the national brand and the low quality
store brand, is quite smaller than f; the degree of substitution between the high and low-
quality store brands.11 Or equivalently a higher variance drawn on the sustitution e¤ects
accross brands. To explain how the output of the high-quality store brand can decrease
with the supermarket service note that an increase in service increases the willingness to
pay (so, inverse demands shift outwards) for the supermarket brands. This is a direct
e¤ect that has to be balanced with indirect e¤ects on the high-quality store brand inverse
demand due to the increase on outputs of the other two brands sold by the supermarket.
Denitely, which one of the e¤ects dominate depends on the complex pattern of substitu-
tion across brands. A low e together with large f and d implies preciselly that the indirect
e¤ect outweights the direct e¤ect for brand H: In other words, the supermarket brand H 0s
marginal revenue evaluated at the equilibrium output levels for the other brands shifts
inwards if and only if 1 + e < f + d:
11 It is also required a large enough f and d; i.e. f + d > 1; to nd positive values of e that satisfy the
condition.
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Now we compute price di¤erentials at equilibrium by substituting q in the correspond-
ing demand functions. It is ease to check that the di¤erence in prices across retailers for
the same brand type is precisely the di¤erence in service, therefore pSN  pDN = pSL  pDL =
xS   xD: Therefore, we can state our rst testable implication for service-quality premia:
only service quality di¤erentials are explaining price di¤erences across retailers.
Regarding price di¤erentials within the same retailer, we nd that the price premia
for the national brand with respect to the low-quality store brand is explained by both
the di¤erences in quality and the di¤erences in costs. This is true no matter what is the
considered retailer: pSN   pSL = pDN   pDL = 13(bN   bL) + 23(wN   cL): Then a second
testable implication is obtained: price premia of national brands over low-quality store
brands are service independent. However, the price premia involving the high-quality
store brand follow a more complex pattern. However, we are able to provide su¢ cient
conditions that ensure that both pSN   pSH and pSH   pSL are positive. They require not
too large di¤erences in service quality, i.e. xD < xS < 2xD; and large enough di¤erences
between bH and bL and between bN and bL with close enough bN and bH : Price premium
expressions and proofs are in the Appendix 3.
Result 2: If 1 + e < d + f , then the comparative statics for the supermarket price
premia are
bN bH bL xS xD wN cH cL
pSN   pSH +   +   + +    
pSH   pSL   +   +   + +  
pSN   pSL + 0   0 0 + 0  
;
while sign @(p
S
N  pSH )
@xS
= sign @(p
S
H  pSL )
@xD
> 0 and sign @(p
S
N  pSH )
@xD
= sign @(p
S
H  pSL )
@xS
< 0
otherwise.
Noting that pDN   pDL follows the same comparative statics than pSN   pSL ; the above
result discloses an interesting conclusion: service quality is a strategic tool that can be
used to target the usual customers of the leading national brand, since it closes the gap
between national and high-quality store brands. At the same time, increases the gap
between store brands within supermarkets to make more attractive the low-quality store
brand for consumers that look for low prices. It is also important to underline that
the supermarket level of service has the same e¤ect on price premia as the high-quality
store brand level of quality though the former is better controlled than the latter by the
supermarket.
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3 The econometric model and the data
3.1 Database description
The data used to test our theoretical model are prices directly collected by the author
in three stores in the south of Coventry (United Kingdom). Two of them, Tesco and
Sainsburys, belong to the two supermarket chains with the largest market share in the
UK (at the time of data collection) and the third belongs to Kwik Save, the largest
discounter chain.12 Tesco and Kwik Save stores considered are located in Cannon Park
shopping center and Sainsburys is located approximately one and a half mile from them.13
The data set is composed of 27 price observations for the leading national brand, the
high-quality and the low-quality store-brand variants of 46 products taken from November
1995 to March 1997 on a fortnightly basis (bar Christmas periods).
The criteria used to select the products for the sample are the following: (i) they
should be present in the grocery of the representative UK consumer; and (ii) they should
be available in three stores considered in the sample. Usually low-quality store brands
are available in only one size and this is the size that we use for the analysis. The list of
products used in the analysis can be found in the Appendix 2.
3.2 Characterising supermarkets and discounters
The supermarket outlets considered in our analysis (belonging to the Tescos and Sains-
burys chains) correspond to the superstore format. With a oor space over 25,000 square
feet and located out of town, these superstores sell a large range of food and non-food
products. The discounter outlets with a oor space between 6,000 and 12,000 square
feet sell also a range of food and non-food products but more limited in size than the
supermarket range.
Supermarkets and discounters di¤er in the level of service-quality they o¤er. The
rst element determining this di¤erence in service-quality is the shopping environment.
Supermarkets o¤er a nice shopping atmosphere with wide aisles, tidy shelves and big
number of check-out lines to assure short queuing times and convenience. In contrast, in
Kwik Save aisles are narrower, products are just piled up on the shelves, the number of
check-outs is small and queues are frequent, etc. Supermarkets accept all major debit and
credit cards whilst Kwik Save only accepts some of them. Supermarkets o¤er loyalty cards
with accumulable points that later on will be transformed in monetary discounts, and the
12Kwik Save became part of the Somereld group in 1998. Then, in February 2006, it was sold to an
investment rm and nally, it exit the market in July 2007.
13Cannon Park Shopping Centre included a few small shops, a pharmacy from a national chain, Tesco
and Kwik Save.
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possibility of using them in the own supermarket petrol station. Supermarkets also o¤er
banking services and the possibility of home shopping via Internet. Supermarkets o¤er
wider opening hours. Finally and more importantly, supermarkets o¤er a larger range of
products making possible the desired one-stop shopping and reducing in this way the cost
of shopping in terms of time. Therefore, service quality is higher for supermarkets than
for discounters.
Supermarkets and discounters also di¤er in the rank of quality variants sold. Large UK
supermarkets chains such as Tesco or Sainsbury sell three quality variants for most of the
products they sell. From higher to lower quality they are national brands (manufacturer-
branded products), high-quality store-brands, and low-quality store-brands.14 Discounters
as Kwik Save only sell national brands and low-quality store-brands (i.e. they do not sell
the intermediate quality).
The national brands sold under the manufacturers brand name are marketed under
intense manufacturer advertising and product development, and are provided with identi-
cal specications to all the retailers (e.g. Heinz Baked Beans). Therefore, we assume bN
to be the same for all the retailers considered.
UK supermarkets introduced high-quality store-brands more than 30 years ago to
compete directly with the national brands. These products are located on shelves very close
to the national brands and tend to mimic very closely their packaging and presentation
(Corstjens and Corstjens, 1995). They are sold under each supermarket brand name:
Tesco and Sainsburys (for example, Tesco Baked Beans and so on).
The low-quality store-brand products (the lowest quality variant) were introduced in
UK supermarkets from 1993 onwards. Their development was a reaction to the arrival in
the UK of Continental discounters that o¤ered a limited range of tertiary brand products
sold at very reduced prices. The products of this quality variant can be characterized as
basic products of manifestly lower quality that are sold at very low prices. Supermarkets
have tried to avoid sales cannibalisation between the two store-brand variants by means of
di¤erentiation. Specically, the two supermarkets sell high and low-quality store brands
under di¤erent brand names and with completely di¤erent packaging. Whereas the high-
quality store-brands are sold just under the supermarket brand name, the low-quality
store-brands combine the supermarket denomination with another word that suggests their
basic characteristics: Tesco Value or Sainsbury Essentials. In addition, whilst high-quality
store-brand products packaging mimics that of the manufacturersbranded products, the
packaging of the low-quality store-brands reects the value-for-money approach that
14This two-tier store brand strategy is not unique to UK supermarkets, Steiner (2004) also identies it
for Wal-Mart in the US.
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supermarkets pursue with them. The very nature of this quality variant precludes any
possibility of outlet di¤erentiation. Consequently, we assume bH and bL should be the
same for all the retailers.
3.3 Analysis of service-quality and brand-quality price premia
3.3.1 Introduction
To test price premia we use the following reduced form equation:
prj;it = 0 + 1DT + 2DS + 3DTDH + 4DSDH + 5DN + 6DTDN + 7DSDN + "it
where,
prj;it =
P rj; it
PKwikSaveL; it
;
i.e. all prices are expressed as a ratio with respect to the price of the low-quality store brand
in the low service quality retailer (Kwik Save). r denotes retailer: Tesco (T ), Sainsburys
(S), KwikSave (K); j denotes quality variant: (national-brand (N), high-quality store
brand (H), low-quality store brand (L)); i = 1; : : : ; 46 denotes products, and t = 1; : : : ; 27
denotes fortnights.
As for the variable denition, DT is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the price
observation corresponds to Tesco and 0 otherwise; DS is a dummy variable that takes value
1 if the price observation corresponds to Sainsburys and 0 otherwise; DH is a dummy
variable that takes value 1 if the price observation corresponds to a high-quality store
brand; DN is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the price observation corresponds to
a national brand; and where i are the individual e¤ects that are considered as random
e¤ects, and "it is the error term.
By construction, 0 + 1 is the mean relative price of Tesco low-quality store-brands,
0 + 2 is the mean relative price of Sainsbury low-quality store-brands.
15 Analogously,
0+1+3 is the mean relative price of Tesco high-quality store-brands and 0+2+4
is the mean relative price of Sainsbury high-quality store-brands. Finally, 0 + 5 is the
mean relative price of Kwik Save national brands , 0 + 1 + 5 + 6 is the mean relative
price of national brands sold by Tesco, and 0 + 2 + 5 + 7 is the mean relative price
of national brands sold by Sainsburys. Further, we can calculate mean price di¤erentials
among retailers for each of three brand qualities, and mean price di¤erentials between
15By construction 0, the mean relative price of Kwik Save low-quality store-brands is equal to 1 as the
reference price is always the price of Kwik Save low-quality store-brand.
13
brand qualities for each of the retailers.Table 1 shows the expressions used to calculate
these di¤erentials.
Table 1: Price di¤erentials
Between retailers for each brand quality
National brands
High-quality
Store brand
Low-quality
Store brand
T-K T KN = 1 + 6 
T K
L = 1
S-K S KN = 2 + 7 
S K
L = 2
S-T S TN = 2 + 2   (1 + 6) S TH = 4   3 S TL = 2   7
Between quality brands for each retailer
Kwik-Save Tesco Sainsburys
N-L KN L = 5 
T
N L = 5 + 6 
S
N L = 5 + 7
N-H TN H = 5 + 6   3 SN H = 5 + 7   4
H-L TH L = 3 
S
H L = 4
3.3.2 Service-quality premium estimation
We calculate the service-quality premium of supermarket r over Kwik-Save for brand-
quality k as the ratio of the mean price di¤erential between supermarket r and Kwik-Save
( r Kj , as dened in Table 1) over the mean price at Kwik Save (for r = T; S and
j = N;L).16
Such as they are calculated each of the service-quality premia can be interpreted as the
average percentage price increase for brand quality k at a high service quality retailer over
the price at the low-service quality retailer due to a higher service quality level., e.g. the
average service-quality premium of Tesco for national brands is the average price increase
of national brands at Tesco with respect to the price of the national brands at Kwik-Save.
Our theoretical model o¤ers two testable implications on service-quality premia: rst,
16As Kwik Save only o¤ers the two extreme quality variants (national brands and low-quality store-
brands) we cannot calculate service quality di¤erentials for high-quality store-brands.
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for a given brand-quality the service-quality premium should be the same for all super-
markets; second, for each retailer the service-quality premium should be brand-quality
independent (i.e. service quality premium should be the same for national brands and
low-quality store-brands).
To investigate the rst implication, we need to estimate the service-quality premia of
Tesco and Sainsburys for national brands and low-quality store-brands. Additionally, we
test for di¤erences between Tesco and Sainsburys price premia both for national brands
and low-quality store brands. This involves to test whether
T Sj
pSj
for j = N;L is signi-
cantly di¤erent from zero.
The estimates of service-quality premia for national brands (shown in Table 2) suggest
that the average service-quality premia enjoyed by Tesco and Sainsburys (over Kwik-
Save) for this brand-quality is about 6% (both ^T KN and ^
T K
N are signicant and about
0:06). Further, ^T SN is not signicant suggesting that for this brand quality there is no
di¤erence between the average service-quality premium enjoyed by the two high service-
quality retailers over Kwik-Save.
Our estimates suggest that the average service-quality premium for low-quality store-
brands enjoyed by high service-quality retailers ranks between 9:2 and 15:4% (for Tesco
and Sainsburys, respectively). Additionally, ^T SL is not signicant (at a conventional
5% level) suggesting that for this brand-quality there is not di¤erence between the average
service-quality premia of the two high service-quality retailers.
Table 2: Estimates for service quality premia
National brand Low-quality store brand
T-K ^T KN =
^1+^6
^0+^5
= 0:058 ^T KL =
^1
^0
= 0:092
S-K ^S KN =
^2+^7
^0+^5
= 0:060 ^S KL =
^2
^0
= 0:154
S-T ^S TN =
^2+^7 (^1+^6)
^0+^1+^5+^6
= 0:002 ^S TL =
^2 ^1
^0+^1
= 0:058
* Signicant at 10%; ** Signicant at 5%; *** Signicant at 1%
Further, to test whether service-quality premium is brand quality independent, we
estimate the following di¤erentials-in-premium: dipT K = T KN  T KL = 1+60+5  
1
0
and dipS K = S KN   S KL = 2+70+5  
2
0
. They allow comparing average service-
quality premia of national brands and low-quality store-brands for Tesco and Sainsbury,
respectively. Our estimates conrm the quality-variant independence of service-quality
premia for Tesco ( \dipT K =  0:034 is not signicant). However, for Sainsburys the
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service-quality premium of low-quality store brands is 9% higher than that of national
brands ( \dipS Kand corresponding p-value are  0:095 and 0:007, respectively).
3.3.3 Brand-quality premium estimation
We calculate the brand-quality premium of brand quality j over brand quality k (with
j 6= k) at retailer r as the ratio of the mean price di¤erential between brand qualities j
and k (rj k , as dened in Table 1) over the mean price of brand quality k; (for j = N;H
and k = H;L and j 6= k; r = T; S;K). Such as they are calculated each of the brand-
quality premia can be interpreted as the percentage price increase of the higher brand
quality over the lower brand quality, e.g. the brand-quality premium of national brands
over low-quality store brands is the average price increase of national brands with respect
to the price of the low-quality store brand.
The estimates of the brand-quality premia of national brands over high and low-quality
store brands, and high-quality store-brands over low-quality store brands are shown in
Table 3. Our estimates suggest that the average premium of national brands over low-
quality store brands ranks from 148% to 171% (e.g at Sainsburys on average prices of
national brands are 148% higher than those of low-quality store brands). Additionally,
between supermarkets pairwise comparisons reveal that the average premium of national-
brands over low-quality store brands is not service-quality dependent, as average premium
is higher at Tesco and Kwik Save (two retailers with di¤erent levels of service quality)
than at Sainsburys ( ^SN L ^TN L = 0:138 with p-value 0:008; ^TN L ^KN L =  0:084
with p-value 0.323; ^SN L   ^KN L =  0:222 and with p-value 0.043).
The estimated average premium of national brands over high-quality store ranks from
38% at Tesco to 40% at Sainsburys, and there is no signicant di¤erence between av-
erage premia across retailers ( ^TN H   ^SN H = 0:021 with p-value 0.432). Finally,
the estimated average premium of high-quality store brands over low-quality store brands
ranks from 80% at Sainsbury to 87:6% at Tesco: However, this di¤erence between average
premium is not statistically signicant (^TH L   ^SH L = 0:072 with p-value 0.233).
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Table 3: Estimates for brand-quality premia
K T S
N-L ^KN L =
^5
^0
= 1:708 ^TN L =
^5+^6
^0+^1
= 1:624 ^SN L =
^5+^7
^0+^2
= 1:485
N-H ^TN H =
^5+^6 ^3
^0+^1+^3
= 0:398 ^SN H =
^5+^7 ^4
^0+^2+^4
= 0:377
H-L ^TH L =
^3
^0+^1
= 0:876 ^SH L =
^4
^0+^2
= 0:804
* Signicant at 10%; ** Signicant at 5%; *** Signicant at 1%
4 Conclusions
Markets sell di¤erent varieties of products in di¤erent stores. Consumers have, therefore,
several alternatives to satisfy their needs. Depending on their tastes they will be willing to
buy either leading branded products (i.e. national brands) or low-quality store brands and
they might also have di¤erent willingnes to pay for those products purchased at retailers
that o¤er high-quality service. As a consequence a plethora of prices can be found for
the "same" good. We develop a theoretical model of retail competition that include two
sources of quality, one inherently linked to brand characteristics and the other linked to
the retailer level of service and then measure their contribution in explaining the observed
price di¤erentials for a sample of U.K. grocery retailer prices collected by one of the
authors in three stores in the south of Coventry (United Kingdom) during the period
starting November 1995 and ending March 1997. We nd that at equilibrium the retailers
that o¤er a higher quality service sell same quality brands at higher prices. These price
premia are explained solely by di¤erences in service quality levels. We nd econometric
evidence that they amount to 6% for national brands and to a range between 9% and
15% for low-quality store brands. Besides, at a given store, the price premia paid for
the national brand is positive. These di¤erentials are very large: around 150% between
national brands and low-quality store brands, around 40% between national brands and
high-quality store brands. Also, the price di¤erential between the national brand and the
low-quality store brand for retailers with broader product range does not increase with
its service quality. Besides, the price of the high-quality store brand approaches the price
of the national brand when service quality increases. Thus suggesting that stores that
o¤er high quality service uses the level of service as an strategic tool to target the leading
national brand consumers.
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Appendix 1. Estimation results
Table A1: Estimation Results
Coe¢ cient p-value
Constant 1 0:000
DT 0.092 0:004
DS 0.155 0.000
DT DH 0.957 0.000
DS DH 0.929 0.000
DN 1.708 0.000
DT DN 0.065 0.153
DS DN 0:008 0:866
Number of observations: 9936
R2 : 0.348
18
Appendix 2: List of products:
Baked Beans in Tomato Sauce 425grs Orange Juice 1 litre
Beer 330ml Oven Chips 1810grs
Bleach 2 litres Pasta Sauce 475grs
Canned Peas 400grs Pasta Sauce 475grs
Canned Spaghetti 200grs Peach Halves in Syrup 415grs
Canned Sweet Corn 340grs Salad Dressing 285grs
Canned Tomatoes 400grs Salted Crisps (Multipack. 6 packs)
Cat Food 400grs can Sanitary Towels (16 units)
Cola 2 litres Shower Gel 500ml
Conditioner 2 litres Smoked Back (8 slices)
Cornakes 500grs Soap 250grs
Deodorant 150ml Spaghetti 500grs
Dog Food 400grs can Strawberry Jam 454 grs
Fish Fingers (10 units) Strawberry Yoghurt 200grs
Flour 1.5kg Tea 250grs
Frozen Peas 340grs can Tissues (90 units)
Hair Shampoo 400grs Toilet Roll 4 rolls pack
Instant Co¤ee 200grs Toothpaste 100ml
Ketchup 340grs Tuna in Oil 200grs can
Kitchen Foil 450mm x 5m Vanilla Ice Cream 750grs
Kitchen Towel (2 rolls pack) Washing Powder 2kgs
Long Grain Rice 1kg Washing Up Liquid 500ml
Margarine 500grs White Bread 800grs
Mayonnaise 400grs
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Appendix 3. Equilibria and proofs
-First Order Conditions, Second Order Conditions and Equilibrium
Outputs.
The system of rst order conditions can be writen as ^ = Aq; or in a expanded way,0BBBBBBB@
SN   wN
SH   cH
SL   cL
DN   wN
DL   cL
1CCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBB@
2 2d 2e 1 e
2d 2 2f d f
2e 2f 2 e 1
1 d e 2 2e
e f 1 2e 2
1CCCCCCCA
0BBBBBBB@
qSN
qSH
qSL
qSN
qSL
1CCCCCCCA
:
By inverting A; we obtain the following symmetric matrix:
A 1 =

1
6

0BBBBBBB@
   3(1  f2) 3(d  ef) e + 3(e  df) 2  2e
3(d  ef) 32 3(f   ed) 0 0
e + 3(e  df) 3(f   ed)    3(1  d2)  2e 2
2 0  2e  4 4e
 2e 0 2 4e  4
1CCCCCCCA
;
where    1  2def + d2+ f2+ e2 and    1+ e2. The equilibrium vector is therefore
dened as q = A 1^:
The equilibrium outputs expressions as a function of all parameters, i.e. bN ; bH ; bL; xS ; xD; wN ; cH ; cL;
are
qSN =
[ 3(1 f2)](bN wN )+3(d fe)(bH cH)+[ e+3(e df)](bL cL)
6
+ [(1 e)+3(1 f)(1+f (d+e))]xS+2(1 e)xD6
qSH =
3(d fe)(bN wN )+32(bH cH)+3(f de)(bL cL)+3(1 e)(d+f (1+e))xS
6
qSL =
[ e+3(e df)](bN wN )+3(f de)(bH cH)+[ 3(1 d2)](bL cL)
6
+ [(1 e)+3(1 d)(1+d (f+e))]xS+2(1 e)xD6
qDN =
 2(bN wN )+2e(bL cL)+2(1 e)xS 4(1 e)xD
6
qDL =
2e(bN wN ) 2(bL cL)+2(1 e)xS 4(1 e)xD
6
:
In order to deal with second order conditions for a maximum, let us dene TS and TD
as follows,
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TS =
0BB@
 2  2d  2e
 2d  2  2f
 2e  2f  2
1CCA ; TD =
 
 2  2e
 2e  2
!
:
-The second order conditions for the Supermarket are that TS be denite negative.
This is equivalent to the following conditions: i) 1 > d2; ii) 1 > f2; iii)1 > e2 and iv)
detTS =  < 0:
-The second order conditions for the Discounter are that TD be denite negative, that
is, detTS =   > 0:
-Equilibrium Outputs Comparative Statics.
a) Comparative statics for qSN :
a.i) sign @q
S
N
@(bN wN ) =sign(  3(1  f2)) which is positive since  can be written as
(1  f2) + (d  fe)2; therefore,   3(1  f2) =  2(1  f2) +(d  fe)2 > 0:
a.ii) sign @q
S
N
@(bH cH) =sign((d  fe)) which is negative since d > fe and  < 0:
a.iii) sign @q
S
N
@(bL cL) = sign( e + 3(e  df)): A su¢ cient condition for
@qSN
@(bL cL) to be
positive is e < df: This is always true if 1 + e < f + d: Note that f + d < 1 + df and
therefore 1 + e < f + d < 1 + df; which yields the result. However, for
df < e < f; in order to get a positive sign we need   >  3(1  dfe ):
a.iv) sign@q
S
N
@xS
=sign( (1  e)  3(1  f)(1 + f   (d+ e))) which
is positive since 1 + f > d+ e:
a.v) sign@q
S
N
@xD
=sign((1  e)) < 0.
b) Comparative statics for qSH :
b.i) sign @q
S
H
@(bN wN ) = sign
@qSN
@(bH cH) < 0.
b.ii) sign @q
S
H
@(bH cH) = sign (
2) > 0:
b.iii) sign @q
S
H
@(bL cL) = sign((f   de)) which is negative since f > de and  < 0:
b.iv) sign@q
S
H
@xS
= sign ((1  e)(d+ f   (1 + e))) which is positive if d+ f < 1 + e;
zero if d+ f = 1 + e; negative otherwise.
c) Comparative statics for qSL :
c.i) sign @q
S
L
@(bN wN ) = sign
@qSN
@(bL cL) :
c.ii) sign @q
S
L
@(bH cH) = sign
@qSH
@(bL cL) < 0:
c.iii) sign @q
S
L
@(bL cL) = sign (  3(1  d2)) which is positive since  can be written as
(1  d2) + (f   de)2; therefore,   3(1  d2) =  2(1  d2) +(f   de)2 > 0:
c.iv) sign@q
S
L
@xS
= sign ( (1  e)  3(1  d)(1 + d  (f + e))) which is positive
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since 1 + d > f + e:
c.v) sign@q
S
L
@xD
= sign @
qNS
@xD
< 0:
d) Comparative statics for qDN and q
D
L
d.i) sign @q
D
N
@(bN wN ) = sign
@qDL
@(bL cL) = sign ( ) > 0:
d.ii) sign @q
D
N
@(bL cL) = sign
@qDL
@(bN wN ) = sign (e) < 0:
d.iii) sign@q
D
N
@xS
= sign@q
D
L
@xS
= sign((1  e)) < 0:
d.iv) sign@q
D
N
@xD
= sign@q
D
L
@xD
= sign ( (1  e)) > 0:
-Price margins, price premia and conditions for positive price pre-
mia.
Supermarket
-Price margins:
pSN   wN =
bN   wN + 2xS   xD
3
pSH   cH =
bH   cH
3
+
xS
2
+
(d  fe)(bN   wN ) + (f   de)(bL   cL)
6
+
(1  e)(d+ f)(2xD   xS)
6
pSL   cL =
bL   cL + 2xS   xD
3
-Price premia:
pSN   pSH =  bH 2cH+3wN3 + (2 (d fe))(bN wN ) (f de)(bL cL)6 + (1 e)(d+f 1 e)(xS 2xD)6
pSH   pSL = bH+2cH+3cL3 + (d fe)(bN wN )+( 2+(f de))(bL cL)6   (1 e)(d+f 1 e)(xS 2xD)6
pSN   pSL =
bN   bL + 2(wN   cL)
3
First, pSN   pSL is positive since bN > bL and wN > cL: Regarding the other two price
premia, we have that pSN   pSH > 0 if and only if
xS   xD
3
  (1  e)(d+ e)(2xD   xS)
6
>
2(bH   cH)  (2   (d  fe))(bN   wN ) + (f   de)(bL   cL)
6
 (wN   cH)
Similarly, pSH   pSL > 0 if and only if,
xS   xD
3
  (1  e)(d+ e)(2xD   xS)
6
<
2(bH   cH) + (d  fe)(bN   wN )  (2   (f   de))(bL   cL)
6
+(cH   cL)
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The above two expressions dene an interval for xS xD3   (1 e)(d+e)(2xD xS)6 ; which
entails the levels of quality service. For this expression to be positive, it is su¢ cient that
xD < xS < 2xD: Also, note that the interval always exists if bN > bL and wN > cL:
Finally, we only need to ensure that the upperbound is positive. That is,
bH >
(d  fe)(bN   wN ) + (f   de))(bL   cL)
 6 + bL:
There only remains to check that (d fe)(bN wN )+(f de))(bL cL) 6 + bL < bN : But this is true
if and only if bN is large enough with respect to bL; that is for
bN >
 6 + (f   de)
 6   (d  fe)

bL   (d  fe)wN + (f   de)cL 6   (d  fe) :
Summarizing, we require not too large di¤erences in service quality, i.e. xD < xS <
2xD; and large enough di¤erences between bH and bL and between bN and bL with close
enough bN and bH :
Discounter
-Price margins and price premium:
pDN   wN =
bN   wN + 2xD   xS
3
pDL   cL =
bL   cL + 2xD   xS
3
pDN   pDL =
bN   bL + 2(wN   cL)
3
:
23
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